



Director of
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IRAQ-USSR: Request for SS-21 Missiles

Iraq reportedly has asked the USSR to supply one of its most modern tactical surface-to-surface missiles, the SS-21. [redacted]

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An Arab diplomat in Moscow has told US Embassy officials there that, according to the chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz made the request during his visit to the Soviet capital last week. Other Arab diplomats say Aziz was accompanied by the Iraqi chief of staff. The Soviet official also said that his government was noncommittal in responding to the Iraqi request. [redacted]

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The Embassy has learned that an Iraqi military delegation is scheduled to arrive soon in Moscow. The Soviets so far have exported the SS-21 only to Syria. [redacted]

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Comment: It is unclear why the Soviet official would discuss this matter with an Arab diplomat. The Iranians eventually will learn of the request as a result, and this will further strain the USSR's relations with Iran. [redacted]

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The Iraqis almost certainly would like to acquire the SS-21—it is a more accurate missile than the FROG and has a longer range—and the Soviets probably would be willing to provide it. The SS-21 is replacing the FROG in the USSR. If an agreement is reached, the Iraqis would be likely to require about six months of training on the SS-21. [redacted]

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USSR-CHINA: Third Round of Talks

A Chinese diplomat reports that no progress was achieved on security issues during the third round of political talks in Beijing but that there was further movement on bilateral exchanges. [redacted]

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The diplomat says Beijing for the first time presented specific proposals for removing the three obstacles that it claims prevent better relations. The proposals for force reductions on the Sino-Soviet border contain new elements. Those on Afghanistan and Kampuchea, however, are the same as China's publicly stated positions. [redacted]

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China now insists that there be no military exercises in the border area, that no offensive forces be permanently based there, and that all nuclear weapons in that region be removed and destroyed. In addition, Beijing continues to demand that Soviet forces be withdrawn from Mongolia and that Soviet forces elsewhere along the border be reduced to the level prevailing in 1964. [redacted]

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Moscow reportedly proposed that the two sides establish a military group to consider the USSR's proposal for confidence-building measures as well as the Chinese initiatives. The Chinese say they refused this plan, but both sides' offers are still on the table. [redacted]

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The Chinese agreed in principle to a Soviet proposal to double their bilateral trade in 1984; to have the USSR modernize two Soviet-built factories, as an experiment; and to increase exchanges in such areas as culture, sports, and technology. The diplomat said, however, that Beijing turned down Soviet proposals for a long-term trade agreement and for a long-term economic cooperation accord. [redacted]

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Comment: Both sides appear committed to cautious progress toward an expansion of bilateral contacts but are continuing to talk past each other in the more contentious area of security issues. Nonetheless, China and the USSR may be moving toward a closer focus on bilateral security issues. The Soviets may explore apparent similarities between some of China's new proposals and their own proposals for confidence-building measures when the talks resume in Moscow in March. [redacted]

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TURKEY: Progress Toward a Civilian Government

President Evren and his military backers remain firmly in charge as Turkey moves smoothly toward its first civilian government in three years. []

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The new Grand National Assembly was sworn in last week and will reconvene this weekend to begin electing its officers. Once the officers are installed, the National Security Council—the group of generals who have ruled since 1980—will be transformed into a Presidential Advisory Council. []

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In preparation for this move, the generals are scheduled to vacate their military posts by this weekend. One of the final acts of the National Security Council was to extend martial law until March 1984. []

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The government of Prime Minister Uluu has resigned, but it will stay on in a caretaker capacity until a new civilian government takes power. Evren and Turgut Ozal, who is expected to be the next Prime Minister, have been negotiating on cabinet appointments since the election early last month. []

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As President, Evren has the constitutional authority to appoint the cabinet. He reportedly has told Ozal he wants a free hand in naming six cabinet members, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and education. []

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The government will not be announced until Evren returns early next week from a visit to Jordan. Within a week after the government has been formed, it has to submit its program to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. []

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Comment: The constitutional process established in 1982 is being meticulously observed. The new government probably will be in place early next week and its program approved by the Assembly shortly thereafter. []

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Evren and top military leaders remain sensitive to the fragile nature of the return to democracy and the magnitude of the problems facing the new government. By exercising his constitutional powers and political influence, Evren is leaving no doubt who is ultimately in charge. []

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FRANCE-CHAD: Maneuvering Before Negotiations

France is supporting the OAU-sponsored reconciliation talks on Chad slated for later this month, but it continues to look for other ways to get the rival factions together. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in Addis Ababa, where the headquarters of the OAU is located, reports that the reconciliation talks will convene there on 21 December. OAU officials hope the talks will result in a continuation of the de facto cease-fire, the eventual deployment of an African peacekeeping force, and the establishment of an interim government followed by elections. [redacted]

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The French have been urging President Habre to participate directly in the negotiations being sponsored by the OAU, according to the US Embassy in Paris. French officials have publicly stated that the Africans themselves should take the lead in solving the Chadian problem. [redacted]

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Paris is concerned, however, about attempts to alter the balance of forces in Chad before the negotiations begin. [redacted]

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The US Embassy in Paris reports that French Socialists maintain "unofficial" contacts with the Libyans and Chadian dissidents in Paris. The French have been using these contacts to discuss an alternative plan that would involve talks between Habre and his rivals, to be held in a neutral French-speaking country. [redacted]

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Comment: Obstacles remain to be overcome before reconciliation talks can be held. Habre insists on attending as the head of state—a demand resisted by the dissidents and their Libyan backers. Each side presumably is concerned about efforts by the other to improve its position before the negotiations get under way. [redacted]

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
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Major Soviet Ecological Disaster



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USSR: Ecological Disaster in the Ukraine

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An article in *Izvestiya* stated that a 5-meter-high wave of potassium salts from a fertilizer plant concentrated enough to "burn all living matter" ripped up railroad beds, flooded some agricultural areas, and killed livestock. It then entered the Dnestr River, killing over 2,000 tons of fish and destroying for years to come the nutrients that support fish life. [redacted]

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The article also noted that the pollution has affected millions of people and hundreds of factories that depend on water from the Dnestr, described before the disaster as the cleanest river in Europe. Drinking water as far away as in Odessa was contaminated for several weeks after the incident, and water reportedly had to be trucked in for public use. *Izvestiya* said no lives were lost as a result of the accident and by late October citizens of Odessa, Kishinev, and other major population areas could safely drink the water. [redacted]

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Pravda's summary of the Politburo's first meeting following the incident stated that the use of water resources was discussed, but the accident was not mentioned. *Izvestiya* indicated that so far only technical personnel have been prosecuted for criminal negligence. [redacted]

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Comment: [redacted] the main damage from the pollution remained localized, although lesser effects were felt throughout the Ukraine. Most agricultural areas in the region do not depend on the river for irrigation, and farm output probably will not be affected substantially. [redacted]

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Repair and cleanup efforts are under way, but there could still be major problems. The *Izvestiya* article reported that an 11-meter-thick layer of the solution had settled at the bottom of the 50-kilometer-long Novodnestr reservoir on the Dnestr River at L'vov. [redacted]

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UK: Strengthening Intervention Forces

London has announced plans to improve its rapid reaction force for contingencies outside Europe, but the government could be constrained by budgetary limitations and political opposition.

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Defense Secretary Heseltine has announced that the Fifth Infantry Brigade, an intervention unit that served in the Falklands, will be strengthened and reorganized into an airborne brigade. The reorganized unit, which already is equipped with air-transportable light armor and artillery, will receive a parachute-trained air defense unit, satellite communications equipment, and more logistic and medical support. A special field headquarters commanded by a general will link the brigade with headquarters in London.

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Comment: The effort to strengthen intervention capabilities is one of the results of the war in the Falklands. London has decided that it may want to intervene in distant areas at a time when the reach of its forces, particularly the Royal Navy, is being reduced. The effort suggests lack of confidence that the improvised measures that worked in the South Atlantic will work in other possible crisis areas.

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The UK will be cautious about employing the brigade. Although it will be suited for independent operations in distant areas, it will not be adequate to engage large or heavily armed forces.

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Political considerations probably will limit any unilateral use to emergency evacuations of British citizens, reinforcing British dependencies, or responding to requests from Commonwealth governments for aid. The UK also might use the force for joint defense of Western interests in the Persian Gulf.

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The intervention force is unlikely to undergo another expansion. British defense spending already is constricted. Parliamentary factions that believe the UK should concentrate its defense efforts on the NATO area probably would not support additional growth.

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USSR-SOUTH YEMEN: Delivery of SA-6 Missiles

[redacted]
[redacted] South Yemen also has received four SA-6-associated radars from the USSR. This is the first SA-6-related delivery to South Yemen, but the system has been widely exported to other Third World countries. The new equipment will allow South Yemen to deploy at least four SA-6 batteries—one brigade—each consisting of one radar and four SA-6 launchers with three missiles each. [redacted]

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Comment: South Yemen previously has had only the SA-2 and SA-7 surface-to-air missile systems. Its defense capability against high-performance aircraft will be markedly improved by the low-altitude, short-range SA-6 system. The SA-6 could threaten ground support aircraft of neighboring countries, especially if the missiles were deployed near the border. The pace of Soviet arms deliveries to Aden has increased substantially this year, suggesting that a new purchase agreement was concluded in 1982. [redacted]


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
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USSR: Supreme Soviet Session Scheduled

The leadership's delay in calling a session of the Supreme Soviet apparently stemmed from uncertainty about General Secretary Andropov's physical condition. TASS yesterday announced that the session, which will approve the economic plan and budget for 1984, will begin on 28 December. The announcement was made on the day that the Politburo normally meets for its regular weekly session. 

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Comment: The decision to proceed with the session probably was made at a Politburo meeting, despite the risk that Andropov might be unable to appear. If Andropov is incapacitated at the time of the session and the plenum of the Central Committee preceding it, the plenum could provide the occasion to take personnel actions intended to cope with his continuing absence. If Andropov can resume an active schedule, however, he would use the plenum to demonstrate that he remains in charge. 

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EL SALVADOR: Reaction to Military Shakeup

[redacted] the officer corps has reacted positively to recent command changes. [redacted] the changes have strengthened the authority of Defense Minister Vides and have encouraged him to try to eliminate the death squads. Vides and his deputy are said to be considering ways to investigate and neutralize rightwing terrorists. [redacted]

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Comment: The recent transfers of more competent—but hardline rightist—officers to key line units may improve combat performance and help reduce internal dissatisfaction with the military hierarchy. Nevertheless, most officers probably are unwilling at this point to turn against colleagues engaged in illegal activities. As a result, Vides's ability to move against the death squads remains questionable. [redacted]

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NICARAGUA-USSR: Helicopter Training

A group of 110 Nicaraguans was undergoing helicopter pilot and maintenance training at an Air Force training center in the USSR as of August, [redacted]

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[redacted] Ten lieutenants reportedly were receiving training as pilots of MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters, and 100 cadets had just completed the first of three years of pilot or technician instruction. The Nicaraguans made up the largest contingent at the center, where students from Communist and other Third World countries were receiving similar training. [redacted]

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Comment: This is the first indication that Nicaraguans may be receiving training on the MI-24 assault helicopter. Managua still relies heavily on Cuban and Soviet assistance to operate and maintain its force of about 10 MI-8 helicopters, and it is unlikely that the much more advanced MI-24 models would be introduced in Nicaragua soon. Most of the cadets probably will undergo maintenance training because the Nicaraguan Air Force lacks qualified mechanics. [redacted]

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[redacted] smaller groups of Nicaraguans have received aircraft-related and other training in the USSR since at least 1981. [redacted]

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WEST GERMANY-US: Economics and INF

[redacted] Chancellor Kohl has indicated that Bonn may again make more of an issue of high US interest rates, now that INF deployment has started. After the Williamsburg Summit, Kohl had expected that the US would hold down interest rates, which he believes are hindering West Germany's economic recovery. He also endorses Economics Minister Lambsdorff's support for a liberal East-West trade policy, as well as Lambsdorff's opposition to broadening COCOM restrictions on trade with the East. [redacted]

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Comment: Bonn probably believes that, because of its response on INF, Washington should show more sensitivity to West German economic interests. As a result, the level of US interest rates and trade relations with the East are likely to become more prominent topics in bilateral discussions. [redacted]

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DENMARK: Government Loses Vote on INF

The Danish parliament yesterday passed a resolution that obliges the government to disassociate itself from INF deployments at the NATO ministerial meetings next week. The resolution, which passed by a vote of 87 to 75, calls for the government to work for the resumption of negotiations and for a reduction in the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles sufficient to avoid deployment of Western missiles. A related vote of confidence that would have resulted in new elections was defeated. [redacted]

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Comment: The minority government withstood the confidence vote by declaring that it was willing to abide by the resolution. The government could accept the resolution because it does not directly oppose INF deployments and will permit Copenhagen to call for no SS-20 deployments. The actions will have little influence on NATO arms control policy but will hurt the Danes' standing within the Alliance. [redacted]

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MEXICO: Increases in Military Antinarcotics Units

The Mexican Army recently expanded its role in antinarcotics operations, [REDACTED]

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This new effort will be mounted in southern poppy-growing areas and will supplement Operation Condor, the military's manual eradication program in the north. [REDACTED] the Army also will take advantage of the eradication campaign to uncover any arms trafficking and guerrilla activities. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The creation of these new operations—potentially a 2,400-man increase over Operation Condor—is unlikely to reduce estimated annual opium production of about 17 tons. The military's eradication efforts have been minor, as compared with the Attorney General's airborne herbicide campaign. Army eradication forces may devote as much effort to internal security as eradication. They do not have their own airlift support capabilities, however, and they may seek helicopters and other equipment from the Attorney General's limited eradication resources. [REDACTED]

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USSR-VIETNAM: Soviet Economic Pressure

A recent article in a Soviet academic journal suggests Moscow is pushing Hanoi to send more workers and agricultural products to the USSR to get some return for the estimated \$5.9 billion in economic aid it has provided Vietnam since 1975. Other Soviet press reports state there are now 18,000 Vietnamese workers dispersed throughout the USSR, an increase of 7,000 since 1982. According to a Soviet official, the existing plan already calls for annual increments of 7,000 workers. The long-term economic agreement signed during Politburo member Aliyev's recent visit to Hanoi commits the USSR to provide more aid to Vietnam for expanding exports. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Soviet leaders want to demonstrate to a populace skeptical of foreign aid that economic ties with the USSR's allies are mutually beneficial. Vietnam probably would be willing to send more workers, but the Soviets are concerned about the political impact of large infusions of foreigners. They also would find it difficult to support a force substantially larger than the one already planned. Vietnam is barely self-sufficient in food, and it is unlikely to be able to increase exports much over the current annual level of a few hundred thousand tons. [REDACTED]

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MOROCCO: Cabinet Shuffle

King Hassan has named a new cabinet to provide unity through the parliamentary elections to be held next year. All major political parties, including the socialist opposition, are represented. Two weeks ago Hassan appointed Mohammed Karim Lamrani, a nonpartisan businessman and previous Prime Minister, to head the transition team. According to the US Embassy, some Moroccans are disappointed over the limited extent of change reflected in the new cabinet.

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Comment: Most key ministers retained their previous portfolios, and the current cabinet is unlikely to change domestic and foreign policies. After the elections, however, Hassan may make more extensive changes in order to address major economic problems. The King's success in gaining participation of the socialist opposition party for the first time may help him to mute criticism of the government's management of the economy.

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